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FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS UNAVAILABLE TO PARENT SEEKING TO
CHALLENGE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE COURT
CUSTODY JUDGMENT
Lehman v. Lycoming County Children ' Services Agency, 102 S. Ct.
3231 (1982)
In Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Services Agency,' the
United States Supreme Court held that federal courts lack habeas
corpus jurisdiction 2 to examine state court procedures3 which involun-
tarily terminate parental rights and place the children involved under
state custodianship.
In 1971 Ms. Lehman voluntarily placed her children in the custody
of Lycoming County Children's Services Agency which subsequently
placed them in foster homes.4 Four years later, while the children were
still in state custody,' the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming
County, Pennsylvania, terminated the parental rights of Ms. Lehman
on the basis of parental incapacity.6 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
1. 102 S. Ct. 3231 (1982).
2. The federal habeas corpus statutes are codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2255 (1976).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) provides:
The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain
an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to
the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.
4. In re William L., 477 Pa. 322, 341-42, 383 A.2d 1228, 1237-38, cerl. denied, 439 U.S. 880
(1978). Ms. Lehman had five children. The eldest lived with Ms. Lehman's parents. The middle
three children were aged 7, 5, and I when Ms. Lehman became pregnant for a fifth time. Ms.
Lehman placed the three middle children with the Lycoming Agency because she had difficulty in
obtaining day care assistance for them. When Ms. Lehman had her fifth child, she selected an
apartment that would only accommodate her newborn child. Her three middle children therefore
remained in foster care.
5. Three years after the children were placed with the agency, Ms. Lehman requested their
return. The agency refused, instructing Ms. Lehman of her legal rights. With the aid of counsel
Ms. Lehman petitioned for increased visitation rights. The court of common pleas increased her
visitation rights to a bimonthly basis. In re William L., 477 Pa. 322, 342, 383 A.2d 1228, 1238
(1978).
6. In re William Lehman, Nos. 2986, 2987, and 2988, (C.P., Lycoming County, Pa. June 3,
1976), afl'd, 477 Pa. 322, 383 A.2d 1228, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 880 (1978). The Pennsylvania
parental incapacity statute provides:
The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal of the parent has
caused the child to be without essential parental care, control, or subsistence necessary
for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity,
abuse, neglect, or refusal cannot or will not be remedied.
Act of July 24, 1970, P.L. 620, § 311(2), 1 P.S. § 311(2) (Supp. 1977). The Pennsylvania statute
authorizes the termination of parental rights without a showing of parental misconduct. Ms. Leh-
1472
Washington University Open Scholarship
Number 4] FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS 1473
affirmed.7 On further appeal the United States Supreme Court denied
certiorari.8
Ms. Lehman then sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal district
court for the release of her children from state custody. That court
denied the writ.9 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed." The
Supreme Court granted certiorari," affirmed, and held: Section 2254
of the federal habeas corpus statutes is unavailable to a parent who
challenges the constitutionality of a state statute under which the state
obtained custody of the parent's children and involuntarily terminated
the parent's rights.
For the last five centuries petitioners have used the writ of habeas
corpus ad subjiciendum12 to test the validity of a restraint or confine-
man challenged the statute on the basis that it was unconstitutionally vague and violative of her
substantive due process right to freely associate with her children. After terminating Ms. Leh-
man's parental rights, the court determined that it was in the children's best interest to remain
with the agency pending adoption.
7. In re William L., 477 Pa. 322, 383 A.2d 1228, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 880 (1978).
8. Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Servs. Agency, 439 U.S. 880 (1978).
9. Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Servs. Agency, No. 79-65 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 4,
1979) (reprinted in Appendix to Petition for Certiorari at 135a), aft'd, 648 F.2d 135 (3d Cir.), a}f'd,
102 S. Ct. 3231 (1982).
The district court dismissed the petition without a hearing. The court relied on Sylvander v.
New England Home for Little Wanderers, 584 F.2d 1103 (1st Cir. 1978). The district court stated
that "the custody maintained by the respondent over the three Lehman children is not that type of
custody to which the federal habeas corpus remedy may be addressed." Appendix to Petition for
Certiorari at 147a. See infra notes 57-63 and accompanying text.
10. Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Seres. Agency, 648 F.2d 135 (3d Cir.), a'd, 102
S. Ct. 3231 (1982).
This was an en bane rehearing. A panel of the Third Circuit initially had reversed the district
court. Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Servs. Agency, No. 79-2466 (3d Cir. July 23, 1980)
(reprinted in Appendix to Petition for Certiorari at 91a). The panel that reversed the district court
held that "federal habeas corpus jurisdiction may be invoked to challenge the constitutionality of
a state statute by which the state has taken custody of children and has terminated without consent
the rights of a natural parent to them." Appendix to Petition for Certiorari at 114a.
On rehearing en bane, the Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the district court. Judge
Garth held that the dispute involved the child's proper custody, not the child's liberty. Such an
issue, Judge Garth asserted, was not cognizable under federal habeas corpus jurisdiction. A plu-
rality of four judges held that Ms. Lehman lacked standing to litigate the children's interest. An-
other judge, Chief Judge Seitz, preferred to await congressional directive. Four judges dissented.
11. 451 U.S. 982 (1981).
12. Black's Law Dictionary defines habeas corpus ad subjiciendum as
[a] writ directed to the person detaining another, and commanding him to produce the
body of the prisoner, or person detained. This is the most common form of habeas
corpus writ, the purpose of which is to test the legality of the detention or imprisonment;
not whether he is guilty or innocent .... This is the well-known remedy in England
and the United States for deliverance from illegal confinement, called by Sir William
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss4/7
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ment. 13 Congress has conditioned federal habeas corpus jurisdiction
on petitioner's being "in custody."' l4 Because the custody requirement
is nowhere defined, 15 courts have enjoyed great discretion in consider-
ing what the term "in custody" denotes. 16
The Supreme Court initially adopted a literal construction of the
term in Wales v. Whitney. 17 In Wales, the Secretary of the Navy or-
dered the former Surgeon-General of the United States Navy, Dr.
Philip S. Wales, to restrict his movements to Washington, D.C., pend-
ing court martial proceedings."' On the basis of this restraint on his
Blackstone the most celebrated writ in the English law, and the great and efficacious writ
in all manner of illegal confinement.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 638 (5th ed. 1979). When the words "habeas corpus" are used alone
they generally refer to habeas corpus ad subjiciendum.
13. See generally W. CHURCH, A TREATISE ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (1884) (assert-
ing similarities between the writ and the Roman interdict de libero homine exhibendo); W. DUKER,
A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS (1980) (tracing the common law origin of the
writ back to the 13th Century); R. HURD, A TREATISE ON THE RIGHT OF PERSONAL LIBERTY, AND
ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND THE PRACTICE CONNECTED WITH IT: WITH A VIEW OF
THE LAW OF EXTRADITION OF FUGITIVES (1858) (tracing common law history); Jencks, The Story
ofHabeas Corpus, 18 L.Q. REV. 64 (1902) (arguing that habeas was originally employed to place
persons in prison).
14. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1976) the Supreme Court, district courts, and circuit judges can
grant writs of habeas corpus in five situations. Custody is a condition for entertaining the writ
except in subsection (c)(5) which is the writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum. Section 2241
provides:
(c) The writ of habeas corpus shall not extent to a prisoner unless-
(1) He is in custody under or by color of the authority of the United States or is
committed for trial before some court thereof, or
(2) He is in custody for an act done or omitted in pursuance of an Act of Congress,
or an order, process, judgment or decree of a court or judge of the United States;
or
(3) He is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States; or
(4) He, being a citizen of a foreign state and domiciled therein is in custody for an
act done or omitted under any alleged right, title, authority, privilege, protection,
or exemption claimed under the commission, order, or sanction of any foreign
state, or under color thereof, the validity and effect of which depend upon the law
or nations; or
(5) It is necessary to bring him into court to testify or for trial.
Id For the text of § 2254, see supra note 3.
15. W. DUKER, supra note 13, at 228; Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83
HARV. L. REV. 1038, 1072 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
16. See Note, Habeas Corpus-Custody and Release from Custody Requirements of Habeas
Corpus-Vkiabilty of McNally v. Hill in the Modern Context, 65 MICH. L. REV. 172 (1966); Devel-
opments, supra note 15; Federal Habeas Corpus Relief Unavailable to Parent in Child Custody Dis-
pulte, 14 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 337 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Federal Habeas Corpus].
17. 114 U.S. 564 (1885).
18. Id at 566. The Secretary of the Navy based the charges on certain "derelictions of duty"
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movement Dr. Wales petitioned for his release.' 9 The Court, however,
denied his petition because Dr. Wales was not "in custody" within the
terms of the habeas corpus jurisdictional statute.2" The Court held that
a petitioner must show physical restraint or actual confinement to ac-
quire federal habeas corpus relief.2' The Surgeon-General failed to
make this showing. 2'
Courts adhered to this literal construction for eighty years.23 In
Jones v. Cunningham24 the Court changed the rule of actual confine-
while the petitioner Dr. Wales was Surgeon-General. At the time the Secretary ordered Dr. Wales
to restrain his movements, Dr. Wales was functioning only as the Navy's medical director. Id at
567.
19. Id
20. Habeas Corpus Act, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385 (1867). By this statute, Congress first codi-
fied the writ into federal law. The language of this statute has remained essentially unchanged
and is currently codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1976). See supra note 3. The Lehman court
interpreted this statute in its decision.
21. The Court began its analysis by noting that what constitutes "restraint" raises primarily a
question of fact.
There is no very satisfactory definition to be found in the adjudged cases, of the char-
acter of the restraint or imprisonment suffered by a party applying for the writ of habeas
corpus, which is necessary to sustain the writ. This can hardly be expected from the
variety of restraints for which it is used to give relief. Confinement under civil and
criminal process may be so relieved. Wives restrained by husbands, children withheld
from the proper parent or guardian, persons held under arbitrary custody by private
individuals, as in a mad-house, as well as those under military control, may all become
proper subjects of relief by the writ of habeas corpus. Obviously, the extent and charac-
ter of the restraint which justifies the writ must vary according to the nature of the con-
trol which is asserted over the party in whose behalf the writ is prayed.
114 U.S. at 571. The order confining Dr. Wales, however, constituted only "moral restraint." The
Court stated that "something more than moral restraint is necessary to make a case for habeas
corpus. There must be actual confinement or the present means of enforcing it." Id at 571-72.
The Court reasoned that because Dr. Wales had the power and ability to leave the city and diso-
bey the order, only a moral obligation, not physical restraint, confined him. Only physical seizure
by marines or a proper officer, or imprisonment, constituted a "real restraint on liberty" sufficient
for the writ. Id at 572.
22. The Wales Court stated: "It is obvious that petitioner is under no physical restraint. He
walks the streets of Washington with no one to hinder his movements, just as he did before the
Secretary's order was served on him." Id at 570.
23, See, ag., Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574 (1960) (petitioner free after completing sentence
not "in custody"); Zimmerman v. Walker, 319 U.S. 744 (1943) (petitioner free after unconditional
release not "in custody"); Tornello v. Hodspeth, 318 U.S. 792 (1943) (petitioner free after pardon
not "in custody"); Weber v. Squier, 315 U.S. 810 (1942) (petitioner free on parole not "in cus-
tody"); Stallings v. Spain, 253 U.S. 339 (1920) (petitioner free on bail not "in custody"); Johnson
v. Hoy, 227 U.S. 245 (1913) (petitioner free on bond not "in custody"); Exparte Baez, 177 U.S.
378 (1900) (petitioner whose restraint would end before return of the writ not "in custody").
24. 371 U.S. 236 (1963). For in depth discussions of Jones, see Note, Custody Requirementfor
Habeas Corpus Relief in the Federal Courts, 51 CALIF. L. REV. 228 (1963); Comment, Jones v.
Cunningham, 17 RUT. L. REv. 808 (1963).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss4/7
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ment. Defendant Jones challenged his conviction, alleging that the
state of Virginia improperly sentenced him under a state recidivist stat-
ute .2  Although in jail when initially applying for the writ, Jones had
been paroled by the time his case appeared before the Supreme
Court.26 Justice Black, writing for a unanimous Court, held that Jones,
as a parolee, remained "in custody" and therefore was eligible for
habeas corpus relief.27 Black stated that because parolees were subject
to restraints not shared by the public, a parolee met the custody
requirement.28
The Supreme Court further expanded the custody requirement in
Carafas v. LaValle.29 In Carafas, a defendant collaterally challenged
his state conviction, alleging that the trial judge erroneously admitted
illegally seized evidence.30 Before the Supreme Court granted certio-
rari, the defendant completed his sentence and the state uncondition-
25. The state of Virginia convicted Jones three times for offenses requiring confinement in
the state penitentiary. After Jones' third conviction for an offense requiring imprisonment, the
state sentenced Jones to ten years in prison partially because of his prior record. In his writ Jones
attacked his third-offender sentence, alleging that one of the convictions was invalid because the
state denied Jones his constitutional right to counsel. 371 U.S. at 237.
26. Shortly before oral argument in front of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit the
state paroled Jones. The court of appeals dismissed the case as moot as to the superintendent of
the state prison because he no longer had custody of Jones. Counsel for Jones sought to add the
members of the parole board as respondents, but the Fourth Circuit denied the motion and dis-
missed the appeal. Id
27. To analyze the custody requirement Justice Black stated: "To determine whether habeas
corpus could be used to test the legality of a given restraint on liberty, this Court has generally
looked to common-law usages and the history of habeas corpus both in England and in this coun-
try." Id at 238. Justice Black relied on both McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131 (1934) and Exparle
Parks, 93 U.S. 18 (1876), for the above quoted proposition.
Justice Black noted, for example, that English courts permitted parents to use habeas corpus to
obtain their children from the other parent, even though the child was not under restraint of any
kind. 371 U.S. at 239.
28. Justice Black described the restraints imposed on Jones as confinement to a particular
community, house, and job. Jones could not drive a car without permission. Jones had to permit
the parole officer to visit his home and job at any time. Jones also was required to keep good
company. 371 U.S. at 242.
29. 391 U.S. 234 (1968).
30. A New York state court convicted Carafas of burglary and grand larceny in 1960, and
sentenced him to concurrent prison terms of three to five years. On direct appeal, Carafas claimed
that the state had used illegally seized evidence against him at trial. (Subsequent to Carafas' trial,
the Supreme Court adopted the exclusionary rule for illegally seized evidence in state court pro-
ceedings. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)). The state courts affirmed Carafas' conviction
on appeal. People v. Carafas, 14 A.D.2d 886, 218 N.Y.S.2d 536 (1961), a f'd, I I N.Y.2d 891, 182
N.E.2d 413 (1962).
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ally released him from prisonY.3  Although he was no longer confined,
the Supreme Court held that federal habeas corpus jurisdiction still ex-
isted32 because the defendant was "in custody" at the time he filed the
writ in federal district court.33 The Court held the case was not moot
because certain "disabilities" survived the conviction.34
Finally, in Hensley v. Municioal Court,35 the Supreme Court held
that a state retained custody, as defined by statute, over a defendant
released on his own recognizance and awaiting execution of a criminal
sentence.36 The Court held that the petitioner met the custody require-
ment because the state-imposed restraints were "not shared by the pub-
lic generally"37 and petitioner remained free only through state court
injunctive action.38
Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, suggested that there was no "vestige
31. After losing his direct appeal, Carafas, while in state custody, sought habeas corpus relief
in both state and federal courts. Numerous appeals ensued, and Carafas finished his prison term
in March, 1967, months before the October, 1967, grant of certiorari by the Supreme Court. 391
U.S. at 235-36.
32. Id at 240. This case specifically overruled Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574 (1960). The
Court in Parker had held that a prisoner released after serving his sentence could not seek federal
habeas corpus relief. Unlike Parker, the Supreme Court held in Carafas that habeas corpus relief
is not defeated by a prisoner's release prior to the completion of the proceedings. 391 U.S. at 237.
For a discussion of Parker, see 59 MICH. L. Rav. 312 (1960); 45 MINN. L. Rv. 453 (1961).
33. The court reasoned that because the federal habeas corpus statutes provide that the court
"shall. . .dispose of the matter as law and justice require," 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1976), the Court
could provide relief other than freedom from restraint. The relief this court intended freed the
petitioner from disabilities which survived his conviction. 391 U.S. at 238-39. See infra note 34.
34. The Court's list of disabilities suffered by Carafas as a result of his conviction included
the inability to engage in certain businesses, to serve as an official of a labor union, to vote in New
York, and to serve as a juror.
35. 411 U.S. 345 (1973).
36. A California municipal court convicted Hensley of a misdemeanor. Hensley obtained his
freedom when the state stayed execution of his sentence so that Hensley could pursue post convic-
tion relief in the federal courts. Id at 346-47.
37. Id at 351 (quoting Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. at 240). The restrictions the state
imposed on Hensley included the obligation to appear as ordered by the state court under penalty
of rearrest or additional prosecution for failure to appear. id at 348.
The issue before thQ Court was whether these restrictions constituted custody. The Court's
language enunciated a rigorous standard to establish the custody requirement:
[Since] habeas corpus is an extraordinary remedy whose operation is to a large extent
uninhibited by traditional rules of finality and federalism, its use has been limited to
cases of special urgency, leaving more conventional remedies for cases in which the re-
straints on liberty are neither severe nor immediate.
Id at 351. Because the general public did not share the restraints imposed on Hensley, the Court
found they met the custody requirement. Id
38. Id at 351-52. The Court noted that the defendant remained free only because a state
trial court judge and two justices of the Supreme Court had stayed the execution of sentence.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss4/7
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left" of the obvious meaning of custody.39 Justice Blackmun, though
concurring in the result, noted that the Court had greatly expanded the
traditional notion of habeas corpus."0
Habeas corpus relief existed at common law for child custody
cases.4 ' Common law courts used a legal fiction 42 to meet the statutory
custody requirement 43 in child custody cases,'4 and held that the actual
custodian of a child restrained the child if that custodian was not the
legal custodian.45 Some federal courts have adhered to that common-
law fiction and assumed federal habeas corpus jurisdiction over child
39. "Strong dissent" is perhaps an understatement. Justice Rehnquist likened the majority to
Faust, "that it has in its previous opinions already made its bargain with the devil, and it does not
shy from this final step in the rewriting of the statute." Id at 355.
40. Id at 354. For a discussion of the Hensley decision, see Note, Hensley v. Municipal
Court, Update on Habeas Corpus, 6 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 249 (1974).
For cases that followed the lead of Carafa, Jones, and Hensley, see Strait v. Laird, 406 U.S. 341
(1972) (petitioner member of armed forces seeking discharge as conscientious objector may seek
relief under federal habeas powers of court); Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968) (prisoner serving
consecutive sentences is "in custody" under any of his convictions and may attack validity of such,
including one to be served in the future); Brownell v. Tom We Shung, 352 U.S. 180 (1963) (ex-
cluded aliens may test order of their exclusion if they are in "technical" custody); Donigan v.
Laird, 308 F. Supp. 449 (D. Md. 1969) (retention of reservist in the Armed Forces is sufficient
restraint of liberty to constitute custody).
41. See infra note 44 and accompanying text.
42. A legal fiction is an "[aissumption of fact made by court as basis for deciding a legal
question. A situation contrived by the law to permit a court to dispose of a matter....
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 804 (5th ed. 1979).
43. For an example of one of the early English Acts, see Habeas Corpus Act, 1679, 31 Car. 2,
ch. 2.2 §§ 11(2), 111(6)(7).
The first United States statute codifying the requirements for the writ stated "that writs of
habeas corpus shall in no case extend to prisoners in goal, unless where they are in custody, under
or by colour of the authority of the United States ... " 1 Stat. 82 (1789) (currently at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(c)(1) (1976)).
44. There were some early cases in which the Supreme Court declined petitions because it
lacked original jurisdiction over child custody disputes. See, e.g., Barry v. Mercein, 46 U.S. 103
(1847); Expare Barry, 43 U.S. 65 (1844).
In In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586 (1890), the Supreme Court refused a writ of habeas corpus be-
cause there was no pretense that the child's liberty was restrained by the authority of the laws or
Constitution of the United States, that is, no federal question existed. In Burrus, a father sought
habeas corpus relief in a federal district court to recover his child from the child's grandparents.
The court granted the writ and the father assumed custody. The grandfather then kidnapped the
child. Because this action violated the writ, the court subsequently held the grandfather in con-
tempt of court and had him jailed. In his own writ, the grandfather alleged that the original writ
concerning the child's custody was beyond the jurisdiction of the federal court, and therefore his
violation of the court order was not punishable. The Supreme Court upheld the grandfather's
position and released him under a writ of habeas corpus. Id at 597.
45. See, e.g., Inre Mitchell, Charlt. R.M. 489 (E.D. Ga. 1836); Mercein v, People, 25 Wend.
64 (N.Y. 1840); Ex Parte M'Clellan, 1 Dowl. 81, 82 (K.B. 1831); Regina v. Clark, 119 Eng. Rep.
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custody disputes.' In Davis v. Page,47 a woman sought a writ of
habeas corpus alleging that the state violated her federal constitutional
rights because it failed to provide her with counsel at a state child cus-
tody proceeding.48 Noting that common-law courts used the writ of
habeas corpus in child custody cases, the Fifth Circuit allowed the
writ.49 The circuit court acknowledged that domestic relations are nor-
mally the business of state courts.5 0 The court, however, held that the
1217, 1220 (K.B. 1857); W. CHURCH, supra note 13, at 662; R. HuRD, supra note 13, at 453; Hand,
Habeas Corpus Proceedings/or the Release ofInfants, 56 CENT. L.J. 385, 388 (1903).
46. See Davis v. Page, 640 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1981); Rowell v. Oesterle, 626 F.2d 437 (5th Cir.
1980); Syrovntka v. Erlich, 608 F.2d 307 (8th Cir. 1979); Nguyen Da Yen v. Kissinger, 528 F.2d
1194 (1975); In re Reed, 447 F.2d 814 (3d Cir. 1971); Bell v. Leonard, 251 F.2d 890 (D.C. Cir.
1958); Lanagan v. Lanagan, 150 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir. 1945). Cf United States ex rel Cobell v.
Cobell, 503 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 999 (1975) (interpretating 25 U.S.C.
§ 1303 (1976) which grants habeas corpus jurisdiction to federal courts to inquire into judgments
of Indian tribunals).
47. 640 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1981).
48. Id at 600. The suit was a class action brought on behalf of indigent parents. Florida had
refused to provide such parents with counsel in child custody proceedings.
Ms. Davis urged that her interest in raising her children was a fundamental liberty interest, and
that to deprive her of her child without assistance of counsel violated her due process rights as
secured by the fourteenth amendment. Id at 602.
49. Id at 604. In Davis the state stipulated that the child was in custody pursuant to a state
court judgment. The state's concession of this point seems rather puzzling. In this case, however,
the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, rather than a private agency, had
custody of the child. This fact may have undercut the lack of custody defense, and prompted the
state's action.
The state mainly argued that because the state court had returned the child to its mother before
the district court rendered its judgment, the case was moot. Id at 602. Relying on Carafas, see
supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text, the court of appeals found no merit to that contention.
The court noted that the state continued to impose authority over the child by requiring Ms. Davis
to report to a social worker and open her home for inspections by the social worker. Such re-
straints constituted "custody." Id
50. Id The federal courts have long held that domestic relations are principally the province
of the states. See United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966); In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 594
(1890); Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. 582, 584 (1859); Phillips v. Rosenstiel, 490 F.2d 509, 514 (2d Cir.
1973); Magaziner v. Montemuro, 468 F.2d 782, 787 (3d Cir. 1972); Buechold v. Ortiz, 401 F.2d
371, 373 (9th Cir. 1968); Carqueville v. Woodruff, 153 F.2d 1011, 1012 (6th Cir. 1946); Bates v.
Bushey, 407 F. Supp. 163, 164 (D. Me. 1976). See also Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 391
(1979); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978). But see Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255
(1978); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. La
Fleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639 (1974); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois,
405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 485 (1965); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158, 167 (1944); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). Contra Spindel v. Spindel, 283 F. Supp. 797,
804 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). See generally Note, The Use of Federal Habeas Corpus in Child Custody
Disputes, 31 ME. L. REV. 265 (1980) (discussion of domestic relations as an exception to federal
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss4/7
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federal constitutional rights of the petitioner made deference to the
state court's interest inappropriate.'
In Nguyen Da Yen v. Kissinger5" the Ninth Circuit held that "vic-
tims" of the Vietnam "baby lift"53 could challenge their presence in
this country by federal writ. 4 The court reasoned that a showing of
illegal custody by the infants allowed employment of a presumption of
detention sufficient for relief.5 5
Two federal circuit courts refused to exercise habeas corpus jurisdic-
tion in child custody disputes. 6 In Sylvander v. New England Homefor
Little Wanderers,57 a Massachusetts probate court upheld the right of
the New England home to place Ms. Sylvander's child up for adoption
without her consent. 8 After losing on direct appeal,59 Ms. Sylvander
fied a petition for habeas corpus relief in federal district court. The
petitioner alleged that the state court violated her fourteenth amend-
ment rights to due process and equal protection by terminating her pa-
rental rights without any finding of parental unfitness. 60 The district
subject matter jurisdiction); Note, FederalHabeas Corpus in Child Custody Cases, 67 VA. L. REv.
1423 (1981) (discussion of the domestic relations exception).
51. 640 F.2d at 602 n.4.
52. 528 F.2d 1194 (9th Cir. 1975).
53. The suit was a class action brought on behalf of Vietnamese children detained in the
United States. During the final evacuation of Vietnam, the United States government airlifted
thousands ofchildren to America. Although most were at some stage in formal adoption proceed-
ings, the government had erroneously airlifted 2700 children not the subjects of adoption proceed-
ings. These children comprised the class in the suit.
54. Id at 1202. Relying on dicta in Jones as support, the court stated that, "custodial re-
straints on a minor child,. . . have long been held a sufficient deprivation of the child's liberty to
be tested by way of habeas corpus." Id
55. Id In support of this position the court cited various state court decisions. See, e.g., Ex
pare Swall, 36 Nev. 171, 134 P. 96 (1913).
56. See Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Servs. Agency, 648 F.2d 135 (3d Cir.), aefd,
102 S. Ct. 3231 (1982); Sylvander v. New England Home for Little Wanderers, 584 F.2d 1103 (Ist
Cir. 1978). See supra note 10; infra notes 57-84 and accompanying text.
57. 584 F.2d 1103 (1st Cir. 1978). For a discussion of Sylvander, see FederalHabeas Cortpus,
supra note 17, at 337.
58. Ms. Sylvander, an expectant, unmarried mother, had arranged to place her child with the
New England Home for Little Wanderers. When the child was born she left it with the Home, A
month later she sought the return of her child. The Home refused to return the child because Ms.
Sylvander's plans for the care of the child were unrealistic. A Massachusetts statute provided that
if a child was in the custody or care of a licensed child care agency, the agency could apply to the
probate court for a decree that parental consent to the child's adoption is unnecessary if it is in the
best interests of the child. 584 F.2d at 1106.
59. 367 Mass. 631, 328 N.E.2d 854 (1975).
60. Ms. Sylvander's claim was identical to Ms. Lehman's claim in Lehman v. Lycoming
County Children's Servs. Agency, 648 F.2d 135 (3d Cir.), afd, 102 S. Ct. 3231 (1982). The claim-
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court found that the custody requirement had been met, but held that
there was insufficient state involvement for the petitioner to seek
habeas corpus relief.6 '
The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the result on different
grounds. The court held that the child was not in custody in the sense
required for federal habeas corpus jurisdiction.62 The court found that
federalism and comity concerns also weighed heavily against granting
the writ.63
In Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Services Agency 4 the
Supreme Court resolved the split in the circuits65 and diminished the
scope of the federal habeas corpus custody requirement.66 Justice Pow-
ell, writing for a six-member majority,67 reviewed past case history and
stated that the Court has found that custody exists only when a peti-
tioner suffers restraints not imposed on the public generally.68  Penn-
ants' were both concerned that the state might terminate their parental rights with a finding that
the parent lacks the ability to handle the child, rather than a showing that the parent actually
committed some wrong against the child.
61. The district court held that the probate court judgment authorizing adoption of the child
was not state custody. 444 F. Supp. 393, 398-99 (D. Mass. 1978).
62. The Syl'ander court refused to apply the legal fiction of the common law. See supra
notes 43-45 and accompanying text. The Court asserted: "It cannot meaningfully be said that the
person in custody-Michael-is being held against his will." 584 F.2d at 111 I.
The court recognized that various courts had extended the writ to child custody cases. See id at
1110. The court also noted the sweeping language of Jones and Hensley. Id See also supra notes
24-28 & 35.40 and accompanying text. The court, however, stated that the rights Ms. Sylvander
asserted on Michael's behalf are chiefly her rights as a mother not to be deprived of her child.
Only speculatively are they the rights of the person "in custody." 584 F.2d at 1111.
63. 584 F.2d at 1111-12. The court weighed the federal and the state interest. The sole fed-
eral interest, the court said, is in the constitutional issues that are collateral to the actual dispute.
Id The court asserted that unlike the state, the federal government had no substantive interest in
child custody disputes. Id
The court then considered the effect that allowing collateral relief would have on the child and
subsequent adoption procedures:
He remains in limbo pending a final decision perhaps unable to find adoptive parents
since his availability for adoption is clouded. Moreover, if litigation expenses mount,
social workers and charitable organizations may well become less willing to seek place-
ments for children over their parent's objections, whether rational or irrational-even
though in their honest judgment the child's best interests demand it.
Id at 1112.
64. 102 S. Ct. 3231 (1982).
65. See supra notes 46 & 57 and accompanying text.
66. The Lehman Court utilized reasoning similar to the Syl'ander court. See supra notes 62-
63.
67. Justice Powell wrote on behalf of Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Rehnquist,
Stevens and O'Connor.
68. 102 S. Ct. at 3237.
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sylvania did not impose any such additional restraints on the Lehman
children.69 Justice Powell further found the children were not "in cus-
tody" in the sense traditionally challenged by a federal writ. ° The spe-
cial solicitude for state interests in the realm of domestic relations also
supported a denial of writ.7 '
According to Justice Powell, federalism concerns and the protection
of state judgments also weighed against expanding federal habeas
corpus jurisdiction to include child custody disputes. Because the writ
changes the federal-state balance, the Court should reluctantly extend
federal habeas corpus jurisdiction.72 Justice Powell further noted that
the state has an especially strong interest in protecting the finality of
child custody disputes. 3 The relitigation of child custody disputes in
federal court through use of the writ, Powell reasoned, only delays
adoption of the child, prolongs uncertainty for the children, and in-
creases the burden on the state.74
69. Id The Court stated that Ms. Lehman's children were not prisoners, and did not suffer
any restrictions imposed by a criminal justice system. The Court further noted that while in the
custody of foster or adoptive parents, the Lehman children suffered no restraints not imposed on
children generally. Id
70. Id at 3238.
71. Id See supra note 50.
72. Id The Lehman Court stated:
The writ of habeas corpus is a major exception to the doctrine of res judicata, as it allows
relitigation of a final state-court judgment disposing of precisely the same claims. Be-
cause of this tension between the state's interest in finality and the asserted federal inter-




74. See supra note 55. Because habeas corpus claims would not be time-barred, Fay v. Noia,
372 U.S. 391, 422-24 (1963), theoretically, a parent could seek federal habeas corpus relief many
years after an unsuccessful custody suit. The sole impediment would be the issue that Justice
Blackmun discussed in his dissent in Lehman, namely, whether a parent who had waited so long
would have standing to petition on behalf of the child as his next friend. See infra notes 83 & 84
and accompanying text.
Citing the Sylvander court's federalism concerns, Powell argued that the state's interest in final-
ity is unusually strong. The state has an interest in disposing of these issues within a reasonable
time. The federal government's interest is in the constitutional issue collateral to the actual dis-
pute. 102 S. Ct. at 3239.
The parties disagreed over the effect of extending federal habeas corpus relief to adoption pro-
ceedings. Petitioner argued in her brief that because of the lengthy delay between termination and
adoption, a habeas corpus proceeding would not likely delay the adoption. Indeed, Ms. Lehman
argued that federal habeas relief may speed adoption procedures because after adoption the
habeas case would be moot. Brief for Petitioner at 84-87, Lehman v. Lycoming County Children
Servs. Agency, 102 S. Ct. 3231 (1982).
Respondent argued that an agency or individual "could not freely and in good conscience, and
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Justice Powell acknowledged that state and common-law courts had
used habeas corpus proceedings to resolve child custody disputes.75 He
distinguished those cases on the basis that, although appropriate within
a unitary state or federal system, a collateral challenge to a state court
custody decision in a federal court constitutes an inappropriate use of
the writ.76 Because of the "profound interference" that federal habeas
corpus involves with regard to a state court system,77 Justice Powell
concluded that the Court should reserve use of the writ for instances
when the federal interest in individual liberty is much stronger than in
this case.78
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, dis-
sented. He argued that the majority too restrictively read the opinions
in Jones, Carafas, and Hensley.79  Indicating that for centuries
common-law courts have had the power to issue writs of habeas corpus
to free children from unlawful custody,8" Blackmun noted that the state
imposed various restraints on unadopted children. 81 Justice Blackmun
under proper sequence of law go forward with such adoption proceedings." Respondent thought
petitioner's argument reflected disrespect for a litigant's right of appeal prior to final action by the
courts. Id at 31-32.
75. Justice Powell cited the following cases: Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187 (1963); Boardman v.
Boardman, 133 Conn. 124, 62 A.2d 521 (1948); In re Swall, 36 Nev. 171, 134 P. 96 (1913); Exparie
M'Clellan, 1 Dowl. 81 (K.B. 183 1); Earl of Westmeath v. Countess of Westmeath, noted in Lyons
v. Blenkin, 37 Eng. Rep. 842 (1821). See 102 S. Ct. at 3239.
76. 102 S. Ct. at 3239.
77. Id See supra note 63.
78. 102 S. Ct. at 3238 n.17. Quoting the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, Justice Powell
asserted that "[t]he awesome power of the writ to avoid res judicata, and its implications for our
federalism, demand that its use be confined to its proper role: the preservation of individual
liberty and the relief from unlawful custody." Id (quoting 648 F.2d 135, 139 (1981)).
Justice Powell commented on the limited circumstances under which habeas relief should be
granted:
The custody requirement of the habeas corpus statute is designed to preserve the writ of
habeas corpus as a remedy for severe restraints on individual liberty. Since habeas corpus
is an extraordinary remedy whose operation is to a large extent uninhibited by tradi-
tional rules of finality and federalism, its use has been limited to cases of special urgency,
leaving more conventional remedies for cases in which the restraints on liberty are
neither severe nor immediate.
Id at 3240 n.19 (emphasis added) (quoting Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 351 (1973)).
See also supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
79. 102 S. Ct. at 3242. For a discussion of the Supreme Court decisions in Jones, Carafas,
and Hensley, see supra notes 24-40 and accompanying text. Justice Blackmun thought "the un-
usually broad and expansive language" of those opinions should have guided the Court. 102 S.
Ct. at 3242.
80. See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
81. Blackmun asserted that children who are wards of the state are subject to restraints in
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concluded that federalism and comity concerns should not bar a fed-
eral court from asserting jurisdiction. Those interests, he stated, should
only influence a court's decision on whether to grant the writ and free
the petitioner after jurisdiction attaches.8 2
The dissenters asserted that the Court could have reached the same
conclusion on sounder reasoning. Justice Blackmun would not deny
federal courts the power to issue writs of habeas corpus in child custody
disputes.8 3 According to Justice Blackmun, however, Ms. Lehman
failed to sufficiently show that she acted in the best interests of her
children. She thus lacked standing to litigate the children's interests as
next friend. 4
Lehman raises the issue of the proper construction of the term "cus-
tody" as used in the federal habeas corpus jurisdiction statutes. 85
While the Court must consider several factors in interpreting the term,
resolution of the conflicting interests of state and federal governments
is ve y important.86 The federal interest is in whether a state judicial
proceeding, while exercising authority over a delegated subject mat-
ter,87 comports with the due process and equal protection requirements
of the fourteenth amendment.8 8 The state interest is in providing chil-
dren of "non-salvagable families" the opportunity to experience adop-
that the state decides where they will live, whether they can marry, or enlist in the armed forces.
The state also makes all major decisions regarding the childrens' medical treatment. 102 S. Ct. at
3243.
82. Id
83. Blackmun agreed that Ms. Lehman was not entitled to relief, but thought the court had
jurisdiction to hear the case on its merits. Id
84. The standing issue was not certified by the Supreme Court in its grant of certiorari. Brief
for Respondent at 14, Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Servs. Agency, 102 S. Ct. 3231
(1982).
85. See supra note 3. The issue is whether the term "custody" embraces the legal fiction
employed by the state and common-law courts, or in the alternative, whether the children suffer
severe enough restraints to be truly "in custody."
The basic difference between the approaches of the majority and the dissent is where one ought
to look to interpret the habeas corpus statutes. Justice Blackmun looks to the common law and
asserts that common-law courts had jurisdiction over such cases. See supra notes 41-46. Justice
Powell considers policy and the effects of conferring federal habeas corpus jurisdiction more im-
portant than the common-law practice. See supra notes 66-68.
86. See, e.g., United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966). The policy considerations
which are necessary to properly resolve issues of statutory interpretation are raised through the
weighing of the federal and state interests. Rehnquist's method of statutory analysis is consistent
with that proposed by Professor Kernochan. See Kernochan, Statutory Interoretatfon: .4n Outline
ofMethod, 3 DALHOUSIE L.J. 333 (1976).
87. See supra note 50.
88. See supra notes 48 & 60.
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tive family life. 89
Federal relitigation of child custody disputes would drastically affect
the state's interest in the adoption of displaced children. The prohibi-
tion against a time-bar for habeas corpus claims inhibits a state from
initiating adoption proceedings. 9 Thus, protection of the federal inter-
est may preclude the state interest.9' At the very least, the state's bur-
den of supporting the child would increase. Justice Powell, by
thoroughly considering these state and federal interests in Lehman,92
produces a sound opinion.9
The majority opinion does not foreclose federal habeas corpus relief
in all child custody disputes. According to the majority, federal habeas
corpus relief remains available for child custody disputes when a peti-
tioner establishes a stronger federal interest.94  For example, confine-
ment of a child in a state institution might sufficiently implicate the
federal "liberty" interest, warranting use of the federal writ.9
Furthermore, the Lehman holding applies only to writs concerning
state action.96 The reasoning of the majority becomes inapplicable if a
89. Brief for Respondent at 34.
90. The argument that adoption agencies may rush adoption procedures in the hope that they
could erect the jurisdictional bar of mootness is unacceptable. The respondent's argument is cor-
rect. No adoption agency could in good faith initiate time-consuming adoption procedures before
a court had finally terminated parental rights.
91. Unless a parent agreed to waive any claim of parental rights, the threat of a federal
habeas suit would remain until the children reached majority age.
92. See supra notes 72-78.
93. Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion is not as persuasive. First, as some commentators
argue, looking to the common law constitutes "an abuse of the historical method." See, e.g.,
Developments, supra note 15, at 1072. These commentators assert that because habeas corpus was
not available at common law for post judgment relief, courts cannot interpret section 2254 by
looking at the common law. For the language of section 2254, see supra note 3.
Second, Justice Blackmun misplaces his dependence on the broad and expansive language of
Jones, Carafas, and Hensley. Language in those opinions support both positions. See supra note
78.
Third, proper statutory interpretation includes a consideration of policy factors. See supra note
86.
Fourth, although Justice Blackmun asserts that the availability of habeas corpus for centuries to
parents in child custody cases, "for at least 100 years after passage of the statute in 1867, the
[federal] writ was not used in child custody cases." Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's
Servs. Agency, 102 S. Ct. 3231 (1982).
94. See supra note 78.
95. The majority in Lehman, however, specifically expressed no view on this question. 102 S.
Ct. at 3237 n.12.
96. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), under which Ms. Lehman sought jurisdiction, applies only to state
actions. See supra notes 3, 72-74, 76 & 78.
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child seeks release from federal confinement.97
Thus, although the decision is sound, it produces an anomaly in the
federal habeas corpus statutes. If the majority's interpretation of "cus-
tody" is predicated on federalism concerns,9" the "custody" require-
ment for relief from federal restraint is more easily attained than the
"custody" requirement for relief from state restraint.
S. CN.
97. See, e.g., Nguyen Da Yen v. Kissinger, 528 F.2d 1194 (9th Cir. 1975). Seejst~ra notes 52-
55 and accompanying text.
98. See supra notes 76-78 & 86-97 and accompanying text.
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